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Abstract: The paper emphasizes the importance of embedded institutions for the 
transformation of  the agricultural sector and rural economies in the transition countries and 
identifies and analyses institutional aspects regarding agriculture and rural development 
common to the transition countries. It focuses on the institutional dimension of reform 
policies, i.e. on the political economy aspects of the transition process that were decisive for 
the success or failure of the reforms. The importance of identifying the “mental models” of 
various stakeholders during the transition process is emphasized and the reasons are 
explored why the transition process in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe has not 
resulted in a restructuring of the agricultural sector towards family farms as most were 
expecting. The paper then discusses the role of institutions for the governance of farms, the 
comparative advantage of farm sizes and the choice of specific legal forms of farms.  
 
Keywords: Transition countries, agriculture, agricultural reform, agricultural policy, rural 
development, farm structure, institutions. 
 
The authors appreciate the excellent comments by Zvi Lerman on an earlier draft of this 
paper. Introduction 
Research over the last decade has contributed to a change in the understanding of 
transformation and growth. It is now generally accepted that transformation is more than a 
technical matter, and that growth is not based mainly on resource endowment. Instead, 
institutions are highly important, even if the term is not always well defined. North (1990) 
suggests a clear distinction between institutions and organizations: institutions constitute the 
rules of the game, while organizations, which are groups of individuals bound by common 
objectives, are comparable to the players in a game. Such a distinction is helpful in framing 
institutional problems. In contrast to North’s definition, the World Bank (2002) suggests that 
the term “institutions” refers to both rules and organizations. Recognizing the close 
interaction between institutions and organizations, this article utilizes North’s definition of 
institutions, as is commonly done in institutional economics, but includes the analysis of 
organizations as well. Both are important for transition.  
 
Institutions and organizations are crucial for productive activities within a country and 
between countries. Productive interactions aim at increasing welfare through division of 
labour, but this specific form of cooperation generally implies some loss in autonomy and 
some uncertainty. The first causes less concern if the latter is limited. It is the main task of 
institutions and organizations to reduce the uncertainty associated with the outcome of 
interactions and, thus, to improve overall welfare in a society.  
 
Williamson (2000) distinguishes four levels of social analysis of institutions. The most basic 
set of constraints that shapes human behaviour in the society forms the so-called ‘embedded 
institutions’, which Williamson suggests as the first level of social analysis. Examples include 
traditions, cultural beliefs and religions. The second level consists of the rules of the game and 
in particular, how property rights are defined and established. The third level constitutes the 
play of the game, i.e. how the rules from the second level translate into actions of the 
economic agents. The traditional focus of institutional economics lies in the second and third 
levels of social analysis. The neoclassical analysis belongs, in Williamson’s classification, 
under the fourth level of social analysis. 
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evolved over time; others have been formally introduced by a society as a whole or by some 
of its members in order to facilitate exchange. Finally, some important institutions may have 
been introduced informally by certain special interest groups in order to improve their 
particular well-being. The informal institutions may conflict with formal institutions and may 
reduce their effectiveness. Embedded institutions also affect the functioning of formal 
institutions, yet they have been largely neglected by Western economists when giving advice 
to transition economies.  
 
This article will emphasize the importance of embedded institutions because they may be of 
special concern for transforming the agricultural sector and rural economies given that rural 
societies are often more constrained by tradition and cultural values than urban societies. 
Research over the last decade has shown that the same set of formal rules may have different 
consequences depending on the economic and cultural situation in the country at the outset of 
transition. Culture is defined “in purely subjective terms as the values, attitudes, beliefs, 
orientations and underlying assumptions prevalent among people in a society” (Huntington, 
2000). Culture is part of the embedded institutions of a society and is reflected in the mental 
models of individuals. These models contain “deeply ingrained assumptions; generalizations, 
or even pictures or images that influence how we understand the world and how we take 
actions” (Senge, 1990). A mental model consists of beliefs, inferences and goals that are first-
person, concrete and specific. It is a mental map of how the world works. Mental models can 
be changed and may have to be changed if a society wants to prosper (Fairbanks, 2000).  
 
Institutions in a country or society are specific and change over time. It is almost impossible 
to identify the total set of institutions that hinder the effective use of resources in a large group 
of countries such as the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) and Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS). The task is even more difficult if the countries under 
consideration differ significantly in their stage of transformation, their culture and, therefore, 
in the importance of embedded institutions and the establishment of formal and informal 
institutions. As stressed by the World Bank, “Where countries are today affects where they 
can go” (World Bank, 2001).  
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institutions and organizations and to recommend remedies. Assessing the weakness of 
specific institutions requires referring to specific countries; the interrelationship between the 
institutions in a given country causes identification problems for cross-country studies. Due to 
lack of data and empirical studies the general hypotheses posed for a large set of countries, 
which may include the CIS, the CEECs, the South Eastern European Countries (SEECs) or 
others, will be supported by empirical evidence from the Russian Federation and Ukraine.  
 
Institutions and organizations are main determinants of the structure, conduct and 
performance of the political market for policy reform. The effectiveness of policies depends 
to a large extent on the acceptance of policy reform by the population at large. But even if 
policy reforms are not supported by the society at large, they need to be favoured at least by 
some stakeholders. Developments in some of the CIS over the last decade have raised doubts 
about whether reform policies received even minimal support from some stakeholders. 
Available surveys in some of these countries can be used to identify the interest in reform of 
the main players in the political market. With this information, policies can be designed 
taking into account the perceptions of the main stakeholders and strategies can be developed 
to change some of these perceptions where advantageous.   
 
Another commonality concerns weak public and private governance, especially in the 
agricultural sector. Weak governance is a main cause of inefficient use of resources in CEEC 
and CIS regions. Private governance problems are most significant in those transition 
countries that, like some CIS countries, still rely on a large-scale agricultural sector. The 
Russian Federation and Ukraine are extraordinary cases in this context because they are 
affected by specific institutional and organizational problems. These difficulties serve as cases 
in point for the general hypotheses developed in the second and third sections of the article. 
The article concludes with suggested areas for future research in the interrelationship between 
transformation of the agricultural sector and corporate governance. 
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Past experience with the transition process from plan to market has shown that in most cases 
policy reforms did not have the expected results.
1 Looking at the political market for policy 
reforms, this section identifies various reasons for this failure:  
 
•  Policy reforms are badly designed.  
•  Policies are not based on advice given by policy advisers. 
•  The policy advice may be inadequate or policy-makers do not follow the advice given 
because they have different perceptions of the needed reforms. 
•  Policies are not well implemented and become ineffective.  
•  People react differently than advisers and policy-makers expected.  
 
This discrepancy between policy advice and policy outcome is particularly evident in many 
transition and developing countries. One may even question whether policy-makers have ever 
been interested in advice from foreign experts; the evidence points to the contrary. One 
objective of this section, therefore, is to analyse the interests of the main stakeholders/players 
in the political market, their perceptions and their constraints.   
 
Even when countries occasionally accept the advice of international experts, the actual 
outcome often does not meet expectations. In this section, it is argued that inefficient policy 
reforms follow from badly-designed policies that fail to take into account the administrative 
capacity of the country under consideration, as well as the embedded institutions prevailing 
there. A genuine policy reform has to take into consideration the microeconomics of 
prosperity (Porter, 2000), i.e. the constraints resulting from all four levels of institutions have 
to be taken into account.  
 
The important role of the first level – embedded institutions – can be illustrated by 
considering the eminent role of mental models. We will show how these mental models partly 
explain the behaviour of the main stakeholders/players in policy reform. Mental models can 
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support policy advice. Subsequently, we analyse the mental models of the main players in 
agricultural policy and the interplay between these players based on the institutions in a 
specific country. In particular, the mental models of those who are expected to react to policy 
changes (and thus supposedly create prosperity) are explored. To these ends, a number of 
hypotheses are developed that highlight specific characteristics of the political market in a 
transition context. Starting from this analysis, we explore possibilities for changing mental 
models, as well as strategies necessary to design polices within the given constraints of a 
particular country. 
 
Although mental models are significant parts of a country’s institutions, the institutional 
environment as a whole is important. The institutional environment includes the total set of 
formal and informal rules: institutions on the second level, which define the rules of the game, 
are as important as the institutions on the third level, which determine the play of the game, 
e.g., when some rules are breached and not sanctioned, or when opportunistic behaviour is 
encouraged. The evolution of policy reform may be highly affected by organizations created 
in the past in response to specific policies. Policy decisions made in the first phase of 
transition concerning privatization of land have given birth to a specific group of stakeholders 
and these may have affected – and may continue to affect – the path of policy reform in 
agriculture either positively or negatively.  
Policy reform in a transition context  
Policy reform is not just a technical matter. Policy-makers do not maximize a well-designed 
social welfare function; rather, the society is segmented into distinct groups, which often 
pursue separate and sometimes conflicting interests. The individual players in the political 
market for policy reform are constrained by the status quo. This initial setting is determined 
by the interaction of the set of all players, the rules of the game at any point of time and the 
results of past plays, which led to the existent distribution of wealth, income and structure of 
the economy. Consequently, the evolution of policy reform is highly path-dependent. 
Although policy-makers have some choice in influencing the course of policy reform and its 
outcome, these choices are limited by past decisions.  
                                                                                                                                                          
1 Selected references on the problems of meeting expectations during transition include EBRD (1999) and 
Stiglitz (2000); for the process of agricultural transition in particular EBRD (2002), Lerman et al. (2001). 
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In addition, policy-makers – even if benevolent – may lack the information to serve the best 
interests of the society at large. They may be ignorant about the causal relationships between 
the decision chosen and their effects or they may simply not know what is best for the society 
at large. The latter point is supported by informal discussions with some left-oriented 
members of parliament in transition countries. These politicians may propose policies they 
perceive to be in the interest of the society at large but that actually have negative outcomes 
because the politicians’ perceptions are not in line with economic realities. One important task 
of policy reform is to clarify what ought to be and how it can be achieved.  
 
If the ultimate objective is to create prosperity, changes must come not only from policy-
makers, who create the enabling environment for change, but also from the general public. If 
the public is not convinced that the enacted policy change is in its interest, it may prevent 
implementation or its traditional attitudes may prevent the reform from succeeding. Any 
policy reform – particularly in transition countries, which have to transform a whole 
economic system  – requires a new set of institutions designed to change the mode of 
coordination of individual decisions. These new institutions, which are supposed to create 
prosperity by changing people’s behaviour, constitute transformation on a large scale. 
People’s behaviour does not only depend on economic incentives, however, but also on 
embedded institutions. To quote Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the United States Federal 
Reserve Board, “Capitalism is not human nature”; but as the Russian Federation disaster 
indicated, “Not nature at all, but culture”(quoted in Pfaff, 1999). 
 
In this context, Huntington’s definition cited above underlines the multiple facets of “culture” 
as a reflection of values, attitudes, beliefs, etc. The acceptance of policy reforms depends on 
the given culture in a society. Mental models are the micro-level basis of culture because they 
describe the underlying beliefs that influence the way people behave (Lindsay, 2000), i.e. how 
they think the world works. Mental models are crucial to understanding the willingness of 
people and a society to change. Effective policy reform in a transition country will ultimately 
have an effect on culture if it changes the mental models of at least some people. Of course, 
the culture does not have to change drastically for the policy reform to work, but the main 
players in a country must be convinced that the planned reforms will eventually lead to higher 
prosperity and are therefore desirable.  
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Mental models are part of embedded institutions, which include informal rules, customs and 
mores as part of culture, people’s attitudes, perceptions, beliefs and cognition (Williamson, 
2000). There is ample evidence that embedded institutions differ among societies and that 
they have significant implications for prosperity. Embedded institutions have an influence on 
the way policy-makers react, how they collect and deal with information and how they prefer 
to design policies. Moreover, the institutional environment (second-level institutions, by 
Williamson’s definition) and those (third-level) institutions that determine the play in a 
country have repercussions on the impact of the behaviour of policy-makers. Research on 
these institutions could form the basis for the design of a genuine policy reform.  
 
Those who have been engaged in policy advising in transition or developing countries have 
often realized that the lack of some rationality in policy design is frequently due not to a lack 
of knowledge on the part of policy-makers (what has and should be done is often obvious, 
even for a layman), but rather, poor decisions “may result just as much from the decision-
makers distorting economic policies for their own interest” (Jain, 2001). Alternatively, poor 
decisions may emerge from policy-makers’ value judgements, i.e. their perceptions of what 
the world could be, and their understanding of causal relationships. Studying mental models 
and institutions is the basis for a sound policy reform.  
The main players in the political market for policy reform  
Because stakeholders and their perceptions are crucial for the design of an efficient policy 
reform, it is appropriate to first identify the main players in the political market for policy 
reform and second, to analyse strategies for designing a reform.  
 
The influence of relevant stakeholders at any given moment differs across countries as 
institutions differ. Past reform and non-reform policies may have had an important influence 
on the set of feasible policy options that a country has at a particular time. These distinct 
differences over time and countries do nevertheless exhibit a common pattern, which may be 
condensed in five hypotheses with particular importance for the political market for 
agricultural policy reform. 
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performance of political markets; in particular, early privatization policies 
created new stakeholders interested either in further policy reform – mainly by 
securing property rights – or in blocking further reforms by inhibiting further 
private ownership in agriculture. 
 
The mode of privatization may have created a strong lobby for securing property rights if the 
new owners feel that they could use their property more efficiently if it were better protected. 
This outcome can only be expected if privatization has led to personalized ownership with 
personal direct use of the property. If privatization has led to collective ownership or personal 
ownership that is used collectively, there will be less lobbying for securing property rights. It 
is not a surprise that the CEECs, which created personalised ownership in the first years of 
transition, enjoy more highly secured property rights in agriculture than the CIS – which 
limited private ownership – have.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The mode of privatization has affected the political market for 
policy reform and has had an impact on the change in mental models.  
 
Transformation requires that people learn to change their behaviour and attitudes to risk. It 
also requires that they learn to gather and process specific information in new ways. Pressure, 
incentive or both might increase the speed and substance of the changes. One might expect 
that the break-up of the old farming system in the CEEC and CIS region exerted pressure and 
incentives to change because the old behaviours were not possible any more. People could no 
longer rely for decision-making on the hierarchy in place during socialist times; instead, they 
had to take responsibility upon themselves. Socialist legislation that impeded changes in large 
farms delayed the birth of privately-owned farms. Labour legislation and issues concerning 
corporate governance of large farms were extremely important. Those CEECs and SEECs that 
dismantled the old farm structure either by restitution or by allocating property widely among 
the population suffered less from the legacy of the people’s socialist behaviour. In particular, 
labour legislation and the old style of public and private governance obstructed the 
restructuring of the agricultural sector less when the old farm structure was dissolved at the 
very beginning of the transformation process. The poor performance of the large-scale sector 
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2 (even worse than the whole economy) coincides with merely minor changes in 
the effective management of farms over the first decade of transition. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The creation of new collective farms (i.e. those farms which 
succeeded the former collective and state farms) has given birth to new players in 
the political market and has strengthened some players while weakening others. 
This concerns farm managers, regional governments and the central government.  
 
Farm managers on the new collective farms were interested in stabilizing the large-scale farm 
sector. The new environment created by the mode of privatization and the establishment of 
the new collective farms increased the income-earning capacity of the managers in most 
cases. The principal agent problem between capital owners and managers, which is inherent in 
large-scale agriculture, was and still is pronounced on the new collective farms. It is difficult 
to control managers because no single principal is strongly interested in doing so. The capital 
owners (the members of the collective) are not really interested because information costs are 
high and being on good terms with the manager may be of greater personal advantage. 
Regarding the principal agent problem between manager and workers, the manager may not 
monitor or enforce labour contracts, allowing individuals to extract rents from the collective 
(theft, working less, getting access to cheap feed and machinery services).  
 
Regional policy-makers and administrators would have less power if smaller family farms 
replaced current collective farms. At present there exists a co-dependence between regional 
policy-makers or administrators and the collective farms. The former group can extract rents 
from the farms and is more likely to be able to provide sufficient food for the regional 
population. The latter can expect to get access to scarce and often regulated inputs more easily 
and on privileged terms.  
 
Policy-makers at the central government level are mostly concerned with food security in 
terms of prices and availability. They often believe that food security would be at stake if 
market forces were governing the agricultural sector. Moreover, the political will to secure 
                                                 
2  See, for example, Csaki and Lerman (1997) and Koester (1999). 
  153food security by domestic production leads to heavy market intervention and control of 
agricultural production. Policy-makers in transition countries seem to prefer mainly 
interventionist measures with high regulatory intensity. Policy measures of this type are more 
easily implemented for a large-scale farm structure because the number of addressees of each 
intervention is relatively small. According to this perception a large-scale agricultural sector 
can serve the political objectives better than a small-scale sector. There is a strong alliance for 
conserving the collective farms or at least a large-scale farm sector.  
 
Hypothesis 4: The lack of an adequate system of public finance, which would 
permit financing the social health and education systems in rural areas, has 
created stronger support for the survival of the large-scale farm sector in the 
CIS. 
 
The collective farms in many of the CIS still provide some social services for the rural 
population. According to Ukrainian law, the municipalities were supposed to take over this 
task from the collective and state farms but they suffered from lack of funds. Therefore both 
the municipalities and the members of the collective farms are interested in the survival of the 
collective farms. Even if there is strong evidence that the collective farms have not used their 
resources efficiently, the rural population may nevertheless be better off fighting for the 
survival of the collective farms.  
 
Hypothesis 5: The strength of individual players in the political market is 
dependent on, among other things, the performance of the agricultural sector. 
Political support for the sector is easier to obtain if its income situation is rated 
badly. 
 
Provision of food ranks high on the agenda of most policy-makers. In theory, when markets 
are functioning in an open economy, food security should not be an issue, and agricultural 
products should not be treated differently than any other product in the economy. However, 
markets do not function well in transition countries, there is high unemployment, rural finance 
markets are incomplete or non- existent, provision of public goods is inadequate, etc. So 
concerns about the availability of sufficient and adequate food without governmental 
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cause concern that not enough food can be provided on the national or regional level. Policy-
makers will more likely lend a favourable ear to the demand of agricultural producers for 
political support if they identify the poor income situation of the sector as the main cause for 
the decline in food production. 
 
In conclusion, agricultural policy reform is highly dependent on the path set. Decisions in the 
early stages of transition have affected the political market at later stages and have affected 
the paths that agricultural policy reform has followed in each country.  
The main players in agricultural policy reform 
The strength of the individual players in the political market may vary across countries, but 
the main players seem to be the same. They usually include policy-makers at the central and 
regional level, academics, bureaucrats, farm managers, agribusiness managers and 
landowners. Land users other than large-scale farm managers, e.g. the newly-established 
private family farmers and household plot farmers, have until now failed to take a more active 
role in the political market of the transition countries (with the exception of Poland). The role 
of these groups is to some extent constrained by the common interest, which these 
stakeholders share. Each group’s understanding of what should be done and of the effects of 
past policies matter for the design and outcome of policy reform.  
 
The behaviour of individual players depends on their personal objectives and their constraints. 
It is widely recognized that institutions – which include a country’s legislation and its 
enforcement as well as informal rules imposed by the shadow economy – constitute important 
impediments to change. But the importance of embedded institutions, in particular the role of 
mental models for the behaviour of players in the political market, has received less attention 
in the case of agricultural policy formation in transition countries. As stated earlier, for policy 
to change it is first of all necessary to change the mental models of the main players in the 
political market and the perceptions of the members. Unfortunately, not much empirical 
evidence is available, but some surveys from the Russian Federation (Interfax, 1997; Schulze 
et al., 1999; Bodganovsky, 2000; Serova, 2000) indicate the importance of policy-makers’ 
mental models.  
 
  155Table 1 presents an overview of selected elements from the mental models of the main 
stakeholders in Russian agricultural policy reform.  
 
Table 1 
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Heterogeneous Negative Negative  Changes  over 
time 
Reluctant   Reluctant 
 
Source: Author’s compilation from Bodganovsky (2000) and Serova (2000). 
 
The first three rows in Table 1 explain a great deal about the active role the state is supposed 
to play in the agricultural sector, according to all players in the policy reform process; the first 
row indicates their consensus on the issue. However, the notion of the “grabbing hand” 
among policy-makers and bureaucrats (direct members of government organization) conflicts 
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negative attitude towards transparency (see second row), this conflict is not perceived as a 
critical issue; the lack of information on a course of action allows for virtual coexistence of 
the grabbing and the helping hand in government conduct. The perception of the role of the 
state in securing access to food (row three) reunites all stakeholders; the overall agreement on 
this issue again promotes an active role of the state. However, some conflicting positions 
show up in the remainder of Table 1. The following section discusses these agriculture-
specific driving forces for the perceptions of the main players and their implications for the 
policy reform process. 
Important elements of mental models 
Several perceptions and attitudes constitute crucial elements of embedded institutions in the 
process of agricultural transformation.  
 
Perceptions of land ownership, jointly with the willingness and ability to transfer ownership 
or user rights. The initial mode of privatization would not matter much if land were highly 
mobile. However, experience has shown that many new owners are not willing to sell or lease 
out their land. The negative attitude in the Russian Federation with respect to land markets 
(private ownership and transfer of land) is clearly expressed in interviews: about 90 percent of 
the respondents disagreed with the concept of land reform (Serova, 2000) and seemed to be 
against private land ownership. Interviews in Novosibirsk and Zhitomir revealed that only 
33 percent of the farmers were willing to mortgage their land (Schulze et al., 1999). Owners 
seem to be afraid of losing the land. Owning land may be considered an important asset in 
hedging risk.  
 
Given the constraints on the land market due to the mental models of landowners and the rural 
population, it is difficult for the sector to adjust to the rapidly-changing environment during 
the transition period. In particular, the ‘migration of factors’ to the most productive users will 
not take place if neither private ownership is secured nor land is transferable according to 
differences in its profit potential. The negative consequence will be a sluggish development of 
the agricultural sector; the situation is worse if the initial land allocation (as part of the 
privatization process) was inefficient.  
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farms. Structural adjustment of agriculture in many of the transition countries is limited by 
policies that aim to preserve structures from the past, i.e. large-scale agriculture in the form of 
collective farms or in some other organizational form. This situation, which exists in most of 
the CIS, results from the perception by policy-makers and other important stakeholders that 
large farms are superior to other kinds of farm structures. Serova (2000) found that this 
tendency is of particular importance in countries where collective ownership arose in the 
privatization process.  
 
Perceptions of the role of the state, in particular with respect to income provision. Interviews 
with the farming population in the CIS often reveal that people blame their bad economic 
situation mainly on the failure of the government and not on themselves (Serova, 2000). This 
understanding has important implications for the efficiency of any policy reform.  
 
Perceptions of food security. Policy-makers in transition countries tend to believe that 
domestic production is needed to secure food on the aggregate level, and that the first best 
policy to secure food for poor households is to provide low food prices. Needless to say, these 
perceptions have had a strong impact on the design of agricultural policy during transition.  
 
Attitudes with respect to changes. During transition policies must change, but people’s 
attitudes must also change. Socialist societies with job security and limited labour mobility 
did not require significant changes of the population’s attitudes in a short period of time, nor 
of the attitudes of policy-makers and other stakeholders.  
 
Attitudes with respect to risk. Societies differ with respect to their willingness to take risks. 
According to Harrison (2000), progressive cultures emphasize the future; static cultures 
emphasize the present or past. Future orientation implies the influence of a progressive 
worldview over one’s destiny, rewards (in this life) from virtue and positive-sum economics. 
Consequently, progressive societies are less risk averse than static cultures and therefore more 
willing to change. Generally, people are better-informed on the status quo than on a future 
status which may result from policy changes. If they are risk averse they rate the status quo 
higher than any uncertain alternative, even if they are expected to gain from the change. This 
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improvement in prosperity, if people perceive the status quo as a viable alternative and if they 
are not able to assess the consequences of alternative policies. This reasoning helps to explain 
why many of the transition countries were not consistent in their policies and often returned to 
policies that were not in line with market orientation.  
 
Table 2 highlights the importance for people’s opinions of mental models and possibly badly-
designed policies. If a high percentage of the population believes that wealth in their country 
is more related to connections and dishonesty than to hard work, it will be difficult to find 
support for a strong market-oriented policy. There is a need to widen the understanding of a 
market economy and to institute those conditions that will eventually lead to prosperity for 
individuals and the society at large. 
 
Table 2 
Perceptions: Causes of poverty and wealth in percentages 
 
Causes of poverty  Percentage  Causes of wealth  Percentage 
Economic system  82  Connections  88 
Laziness and  drinking  77  Economic system  78 
Unequal possibilities  65  Dishonesty  76 
Discrimination 47  Good  possibilities  62 
Lack of effort  44  Talents  50 
No talents  33  Luck  42 
Bad luck  31  Hard work  39 
 
Source: A survey by Interfax AIF of 1 585 respondents (November 1997). 
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Strategies to design reform policies 
The starting point for policy reform in any transition country is the initiation of a change in 
the mental models of the main players, and should include strategies to deal with the 
particular interests of the main stakeholders. Of course, it is difficult to design a blueprint as 
countries vary significantly; but a general approach seems possible at least in cases where 
policy-makers are benevolent and are interested in creating prosperity.  
 
Strategies to change mental models 
Rural economies in socialist times used to be more static than progressive. Delegation of 
power and critical questioning of what was to be done and could have been done better were 
neither encouraged nor desired. These societies had characteristics that significantly differed 
from those in progressive societies. One way to change mental models is to open up the 
society through interaction with other societies. The preferred instruments for this type of 
interaction are personalized contacts between people from different societies. However, this 
explicitly does not mean that the young people – with their usual high willingness to change – 
should permanently migrate out. The short-run gain in foreign currency that might be sent 
back from emigrants is outweighed by far by the long-run dangers of “brain drain”. Rural 
areas may become poorer if those who are willing to change leave the region and leave behind 
those who are either unable or unwilling to change.  
 
Opening up a fairly closed society should be achieved instead either by having people from 
other countries come to the region (temporarily or permanently) or by organizing trips for 
people to travel to other countries. The first alternative is likely limited, but may be needed. 
External assistance might be the quickest way towards setting up a more prosperity-oriented 
research system and introducing more efficient styles of public and private governance. 
Organized trips are advisable for selective groups of main stakeholders in order to expose 
them to alternative systems so that as a consequence they may be less opposed to policy 
reforms.
3 Travelling is but one way; freeing the press, reshaping education and reorganization 
                                                 
3 It may be worthwhile to remember the Japanese experience and development success which began in the last 
third of the nineteenth century. “No opportunity for learning was lost. In October 1871, a high level Japanese 
delegation … travelled to the United States and Europe, visiting factories and forges, shipyards and armories, 
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main players in the reform process.  
 
Policy reform imposed from outside often lacks the support of the society at large and may 
become ineffective due to inadequate implementation or due to adverse reaction of 
individuals. Successful policy reforms must express the political will of the society. But first 
the people must be convinced that the policy change will lead to prosperity. It may not be too 
difficult to convince policy-makers and the public on the need for policy reform, but it will be 
more difficult to agree on a specific direction. Furthermore, agricultural policy-makers and 
the main stakeholders have to know the possible effects of alternative policy decisions on 
food security, resource use and the livelihood of rural regions. A policy debate that includes 
experience from other countries and encompasses the public could eventually contribute to 
changes in mental models. The beliefs in food security based on domestic production as a first 
priority and in the superiority of large-scale or even collective farms have to be challenged. A 
free press could raise these issues and would be helpful in preparing the basis for a sound 
policy reform.  
 
It is unlikely that most individuals in a reforming country are either able or willing to 
understand the need for policy reform and its implications. Education, on-the-job training and 
extension should rank high on the reform agenda. The experience in many transition countries 
does not demonstrate recognition of these priorities. The education and research systems have 
not changed much in most of the CIS countries. Actually, the organizational structure of the 
research institutes has often not changed; if changes occurred, these occasionally even led to 
worse outcomes.  
 
Finally, opening up minds and promoting changes in attitudes are very important for the 
management of the farm and agribusiness enterprises; managers need to be exposed to 
external views. One alternative would be to set up an extension service for all types of farms 
and to introduce advisory circles, of a limited number of farms, which would have to open 
their books on a mutual basis to compare them on the basis of their performance. Although 
                                                                                                                                                          
railways and canals. They returned in September 1873, almost two years later, laden with the spoils of learning 
and ‘on fire with enthusiasm’ for reform’” (Landes, 2000). The Japanese experience underlines the importance 
of opening up a society. 
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not very reliable. The methods employed for calculating costs, gross margins and profit is not 
in line with market economies – and it is very difficult to engage farm managers in 
discussions on farm performance, in particular in relation to other managers’ performance. 
Introducing such a mutual advisory procedure would also mitigate the principal agent 
problems on the large-scale farms because it would substantially increase the transparency of 
the management and make it easier to monitor the managers. 
 
Strategies to deal with the main stakeholders 
In their analysis of the Russian reform process, Shleifer and Treisman (2000) focus on the 
issue of dealing with the main stakeholders. Efficiency- and welfare-enhancing reforms often 
threaten the interests of certain powerful social actors. These actors can prevent reform, either 
through centralized action that prevents enactment, or through decentralized efforts in 
particular locations that prevent implementation (Shleifer and Treisman, 2000). 
 
A radical market-oriented reform process often neglects the interest of those main 
stakeholders, who would have to be expropriated. They must be deprived of the power to 
prevent specific reforms that are not in their interests. Such a strategy, possible at the 
beginning of the reform process, may be a reasonable alternative in some countries. If the 
public is convinced that a reform is needed and that the final outcome will eventually result in 
higher prosperity, a benevolent policy-maker may opt for a radical reform. Indeed, the reform 
might be sustainable if positive results are visible promptly. If a positive outcome does not 
materialize, the radical reform process may be stopped and even reversed, with highly 
negative consequences for the transition policy. Indeed, in many instances, well-intended 
radical reforms were reversed.  
 
An alternative, often followed in transition countries, is to co-opt the main stakeholders. Co-
optation does not imply dealing the stakeholders out of the game but rather dealing them new 
cards. The reform entrepreneurs do not remove the stakeholders’ veto power, but create 
incentives for them not to exercise it by giving some benefits to the stakeholders in return for 
their support of reforms (Shleifer and Treisman, 2000). The lack of co-optation of the main 
stakeholders in the reform process seems to be the most important determinant of the 
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the Russian Federation and Ukraine is supported by the changes in the interests of the main 
stakeholders, the farm managers, the agribusiness managers and the large non-agricultural 
operators. They were able to benefit from the reform process in recent years because they had 
accumulated financial means and could take advantage of the newly-passed tax legislation 
(Koester, 2003). 
 
Corporate governance in the context of transforming agriculture in transition 
countries 
The problem stated 
The analysis of corporate governance and its relevance for economic development has its 
foundations in the finance literature, under the heading of addressing “the ways in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on investment” 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The literature on corporate governance is generally based on the 
premise that the main corporate governance problem is self-interested management and weak, 
dispersed shareholders (Berglöf and von Thadden, 1999). It is likely due to this particular 
framing of the governance problem that this issue has not been ranked high on the research 
agenda of agricultural economics. Most farms in market economies are run by managers who 
own the major share of the farm assets. This holds true even for tenant farmers. Consequently, 
the conflict of interest between the manager and the shareholders is absent in most 
agricultural sectors in market economies. The situation is significantly different is many 
transition economies.  
 
Moreover, the problem of corporate governance in transition countries, in particular in the 
agricultural sector, is wider than stated above. “The market-based governance approach 
should be broadened to include the problem of owner-controlled firms and large block-
holders, but also should be generalized to a model of multilateral negotiations and influence-
seeking among many different stakeholders and outside constraints and must take into 
account the effects of a country’s legal and political system of these check and balances” 
(Berglöf and von Thadden, 1999). In particular, the interaction between corporate governance 
arrangements and the political system is of relevance for governance of alternative types of 
farms in transition countries. These topics should be included under the heading of corporate 
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signals from product and input markets into firm behaviour (Berglöf and von Thadden, 1999). 
This broad definition leads us to highlight the following issues in the agricultural policy 
reform process of transition countries. 
 
The importance of analysing the institutions is in part to reveal the existence of alternative 
types of farms in a country. Types of farms can be classified as follows: 
 
1)  new collective farms as successors of the former kolkhozes and sovkhozes;  
 
2)  cooperative farms that often succeed the new collective farms or may have emerged 
directly from kolkhozes and sovkhozes;  
 
3)  corporate farms in the form of limited liability companies or other legal forms; 
 
4)  holding companies (synonymous with agro-holdings), which may include agricultural 
entities, processing and input supplying firms and others, such as Gazprom in Russia, or 
banks; 
 
5)  private farms either in the form of single ownership organized as family farms or as 
large-scale farms, based on hired work;  
 
6)  part-time farms; and  
 
7)  household farms (synonymous with household plots). 
 
It is mostly private farms under family management and part-time farms that have importance 
in market economies. In contrast, they are of minor importance in most transition countries. 
Some of these countries – mainly the Russian Federation, Belarus and (up to recently) 
Ukraine – still rely mainly on collective farms and household farms (Lerman, 2001). Other 
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to grant a living. Of particular interest are recent changes in the Russian Federation and 
Ukraine: holdings – even if they are forbidden by law – have emerged on a significant scale in 
the Russian Federation and on a less important scale in Ukraine. Household plots are a 
phenomenon typical for the agricultural sector in transition countries. These are characterized 
by a very small scale of production, high labour/land ratio and few formally-obtained 
intermediate inputs. This organizational form is barely existent in developed market 
economies, but accounts for up to more than half of all agricultural production in some 
countries.  
 
Institutions that affect the comparative advantage of specific types of farms in a country are 
partly first-level institutions (Williamson, 2000). These are informal rules based on a 
country’s past, including cultural beliefs, norms and values of the society and tradition-laden 
behaviour. The latter might be of special concern for the selection or the performance of 
specific types of farms. The existence of specific types of farms also depends on the 
institutional environment (rules of play) and how those institutions are implemented (the play 
of the game).  
 
Reaction to market signals may differ for alternative types of farms, depending on institutions 
on the farms, but also on the institutional environment and its mode of implementation. The 
reaction may be large or small depending on the degree of awareness of changes in the 
environment and the willingness and ability to react. All of these determinants are affected by 
institutions.  
 
The reaction of specific types of farms to changes in market signals is of importance for 
policy-makers. Markets in transition countries are not functioning well. There may be 
significant divergences between social and private marginal costs; moreover, market prices do 
not always reflect shadow prices from an economic point of view. Market signals may induce 
adjustment that is rational from the private point of view, but not from the point of view of the 
society at large. Divergences on the labour market in rural areas are one main cause of the 
problem; others include the market power of buying and selling agencies and the 
interrelationship between farms and the social sphere. These divergences may induce policy-
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collective ones. The response to market signals may be hampered for collective farms due to 
restrictions (formal or informal) imposed on them by bureaucrats or policy-makers.  
 
These issues deserve more attention. Farm structure (with respect to types of farms, size and 
pattern of production) changed marginally in most transition countries only after the first 
initiatives by the governments to restructure the sector. It is widely accepted that further 
restructuring is needed in all countries, albeit with different requirements, but the speed of 
restructuring is slow. It is worth investigating why farm structure is so stable over time and 
how structural change can be accelerated.  
 
A few countries have witnessed significant changes in farm structure in the last years, namely 
the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Collective and household farms dominated both 
countries’ agriculture up to 1999, but a new type of farm has emerged over the last two years: 
the so-called agroholding. We present some hypotheses for the stability of the structure over 
nearly ten years and for the recent changes.  
Corporate governance and the stability of farm structure in main CIS countries 
Hypothesis 1: The formal institutional framework, which was (or still is) decisive 
for the collective farms, created corporate governance problems.  
Important second-level institutional characteristics were (and may continue to be):   
 
•  no clear distinction between interests of capital owners and workers; 
•  labour law legislation that made it impossible or costly to dismiss workers; 
•  wage level changes determined or accepted by the collective farm’s assembly of 
members; 
•  rules for exit of members from the collective farm; 
•  rules for hiring a manager; and 
•  rules for distributing profits among capital owners and workers. 
 
  166Hypothesis 2: Collective farm governance played a minor role in the 
restructuring of the sector, as governments intervened strongly. The main causes 
of the delays in adjustment were not the rules of the play (second-level 
institutions), but the play of the game (third-level institutions).  
 
Important third-level institutions were or still are: 
 
•  allocation of subsidies by the central or regional governments; 
•  allocation of inputs, in particular fuel, by the local administration; 
•  enforcement by the local government of a specific pattern of production; 
•  granting of credit by government bodies through acceptance of delays in payment (soft 
budget constraints); 
•  granting access to subsidised credit;  
•  impeding the exit of farm members by delaying the process of granting access to land 
and other assets; and 
•  theft. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Governance on the collective farms was significantly affected by the 
interaction between the collective farms (mother farms) and the household plots. 
 
Important institutions were or still are: 
 
•  provision of products and services at so-called ‘at-cost prices’ to household farms; 
•  theft of production factors; 
•  payments in kind for work delivered; 
•  the value-added tax system; and 
•  the income tax system. 
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governance problem. 
 
The main institutions were or still are: 
 
•  lack of entrepreneurship and lack of know-how; 
•  policies creating uncertainty, which affected reactions to market signals; 
•  uncertainty created by discretionary decisions of policy-makers and bureaucrats, 
which affected the expansion of the private farm sector; and 
•  discrimination by public authorities. 
 
The consequences of the above hypotheses were so far-reaching that production in most 
transition countries declined over time and the production potential of the collective farms, 
measured in terms of resource endowment, eroded. The prospects of collective farms are dim, 
to say the least.  
Corporate governance problems in the recently-emerging farm sector in the 
Russian Federation 
The situation in Russian agriculture is characterized by significant restructuring over the last 
two years, where a new type of organizational form emerged under the responsibility of new, 
mostly outside operators. Rylko (2001) interviewed on and analysed a sample of 16 such 
agroholdings, and found that the average enterprise size is very large as compared to market 
economy standards. Fourteen had an average size of nearly 37 000 ha. One of them controlled 
19 collective farms in two regions with a total size of about 150  000 ha. The mother 
enterprises are usually active in different sectors, including those close to agriculture in the 
value-added chain, such as processors, input suppliers or custom farming. Others, such as 
Gazprom, had no direct production ties to agriculture. Unfortunately, precise information on 
the significance of this new form of operation is not available, but Rylko estimates that they 
have about a 10 percent share of arable land in the Russian Federation. However, they are not 
uniformly distributed all over the country but concentrated in regions with fertile soil. More 
recent estimates (Zimmermann and Schüle, 2003) are lower with regard to the share for the 
Russian Federation as a whole (about 3 percent of arable land) but confirm the high 
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Belgorod: 36 percent of UAA).  
 
The motive behind this change is not quite clear. Rylko performed interviews in which the 
following answers were given (though they probably do not reveal the real reasons): “We got 
tired of non-paybacks by farms and decided to control the whole production chain.” “We 
wanted to receive necessary quantities of inexpensive quality raw material on a timely basis.” 
“We thought that agriculture was a good place in which to put money.” One operator 
expressed what was on the minds of others: “We don’t see any reason why agriculture in the 
Russian Federation cannot be a highly profitable business. You only need new assets, new 
technology, new management and new people” (Rylko, 2001). 
 
The real motives are likely different ones – that is, economic or political. One motive might 
be in order to take advantage of the exemption from profit taxes in agriculture and of the fixed 
asset tax (OECD, 1998). Integration of agriculture with non-agricultural enterprises could 
allow for the shifting of profits to agricultural enterprises, thus lowering the overall tax rate. 
Moreover, it is quite obvious that these enterprises may have significant political influence. 
They are the main employers in rural areas and can expect to be taken into account in the 
political decision-making process. The influence might be reflected in the current land law, 
which includes a right of pre-emption for the person or legal entity that has farmed the land 
over the last three years (Zimmermann and Schüle, 2003). 
 
Hypothesis 1: The new type of agriculture, with up to 500 000 ha under the 
umbrella of a holding, will likely create highly capital-intensive farms.  
 
Given agricultural technology and international prices for machinery, highly capital-intensive 
production methods may be superior to less capital-intensive ones in certain activities, even at 
very low labour costs. The superiority of a highly capital-intensive technology is evident 
mainly in those sectors where it produces higher yields due to superior cultivation, superior 
harvesting and/or superior dosages of yield-increasing inputs (precision farming). Such 
methods become even more advantageous if the farm’s cultivated area is large or if the farms 
have access to customs services.     
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The comparative advantage of large-scale farms depends to a large extent on corporate 
governance; the main problems are related to the monitoring and enforcing of labour 
contracts. Technological progress in communication (which has lowered transaction costs 
related to labour monitoring) and production has increased the comparative advantage of 
large-scale farms in specific production activities. Furthermore, capital intensity will increase 
if there are restrictions on hiring and firing labour and/or if enforcement of labour contracts is 
difficult due to traditional behaviour of workers or due to formal or informal rules. Large-
scale farms in particular will favour those products that can be produced with high capital 
intensity. It can be expected that the tendency towards capital-intensive methods will continue 
for the foreseeable future. (See parallels in the structural development of East Germany.)  
 
Hypothesis 2: Transforming agriculture to large-scale farms may improve the 
private return in agriculture, but it may lower the economic return for the 
society at large. Moreover, it may create social problems.  
 
The present restructuring of the agricultural sector in the Russian Federation is partly a 
reaction to market signals, but the market signals confronted by private decision-makers are 
distorted. The tax system, with lower profit taxes in agriculture than in other sectors, favours 
investment in agriculture. The market price for labour is higher than the shadow price, 
meaning that private decisions on factor intensity do not lead to an optimal result from 
society’s point of view. If increased efficiency in agriculture leads to unemployment (while 
the unemployed still have a positive marginal productivity), the efficiency of the overall 
economy, which should be the central objective of any economic policy, is not improved. In 
addition, it is probable that increases in the already huge rate of rural area unemployment will 
cause social hardship and political unrest. Finally, the new farm structure may shift the 
economic and political power in rural areas towards the operators of the large-scale farms, 
with long-lasting repercussions on political decision-making and the distribution of income.  
Corporate governance problems in the recently-emerging farm sector in 
Ukraine 
In Ukraine, the structure of main players in agricultural production has changed significantly 
over time: Until the end of 1999 the typical agricultural enterprise in Ukraine was the 
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agricultural land in use by agricultural enterprises. 
  
Table 3 
Number of agricultural enterprises in Ukraine 
  On 1 December 1999  On 1 December 2000 
Organizational and legal form 
of enterprises 
Number  Percentage  Number  Percentage 
Collective Agricultural 
Enterprises 
8 102  63.8  -  - 
Agricultural companies  1 803  14.2  6 761  50.0 
Agricultural cooperatives  284  2.2  3 325  24.7 
Private enterprises  470  3.7  2 901  21.5 
Others  2 041  16.1  500  3.8 
 
Source: Preliminary data of the Ministry of Agricultural Policy of Ukraine (2000). Quoted in Puhachov 
and Puhachova, 2001. 
 
Private farms played a minor role until December 2000 (when they numbered about 35 000). 
The figures for 2001 indicate a substantial increase in numbers, to more than 40 000. Their 
share in total agricultural land amounted to 16.5 percent in 2000, while the average size of 
these farms doubled between 1998 and 2001, to more than 60  ha. Their share in total 
agricultural production is generally negligible (about 0.5  percent). On the other hand, the 
number of household plots is still high, with a share in gross agricultural production of more 
than 60 percent in 2000.  
 
According to official data, almost 90 percent of CAEs reported losses in 1999, in spite of 
massive subsidies (von Cramon-Taubadel and Zorya, 2001). Apparently the government 
eventually became convinced that the CAE as an enterprise type was badly equipped to 
revitalize the agricultural sector, and on 3 December 1999 issued Decree of the President of 
Ukraine No. 1529/99 “On urgent measures for accelerating the restructuring of the 
agricultural sector of the economy” (Puhachov and Puhachova, 2001). The decree ordered 
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private ownership-based enterprises – such as private farms, private enterprises, agricultural 
companies or agricultural cooperatives – by April 2000. Moreover, all members of CAEs 
were allowed to leave the CAEs freely and to withdraw their land and property shares. 
Members could cultivate their own land, for example by expanding their household farms, or 
could start a private farm on their own and/or rented land. In fact, full-time farming required 
renting or buying land, as the average land share in Ukraine was only 4.1 ha (von Cramon-
Taubadel and Zorya, 2001).  
 
The decree may be considered the most important formal institutional change in Ukraine after 
the first law on land reform of December 1990 (Puhachov and Puhachova, 2001). In principle, 
it aimed mainly to put into practice what was already officially required by other laws and 
decrees (e.g. the allocation of property and the possibility of taking out individual shares were 
already legally possible). Surprisingly, the decree did not share the same fate as many others 
that were formally in place but not effective. The success of the decree became obvious in 
subsequent legislation. In 2001, land code legislation was approved by Parliament, and in 
2002 a presidential decree announced further rules regarding the distribution of the assets of 
the former CAEs, expanding the above-mentioned December 1999 decree on land sharing.  
 
The reasons for the effectiveness of this renewed attempt at land privatization ought to be 
explored. One hypothesis is that the President took the initiative soon after his election in 
October 1999, relying on momentum to get it through. The time seemed ripe. There was 
broad consensus that significant changes were needed; agricultural production capacity was 
eroding continuously and it was evident there was a need for political action. In addition, the 
institutional environment had changed over time, helping to make the new decree effective. 
Many managers of collective farms had accumulated experience and funds (or access to them) 
that allowed them to run farms on their own. Moreover, investment in agriculture became 
profitable for non-agriculturists, as agricultural enterprises do not have to pay taxes on profits 
nor value-added tax. Shifting revenue and profit from non-agricultural to agricultural 
enterprises could pay for an integrated company.  
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companies (50 percent) or agricultural cooperatives (24.7 percent); private enterprises had 
increased their share from 3.7 in 1999 to 21.5 percent in 2000. The restructuring process had 
two phases. During the first phase many managers of collective farms tried to take over the 
farms by renting the land from the members of the collective farm. Thus, the old farm 
continued, but in a different legal form. This process was possible because many of the 
newly-created enterprises did not adhere to the legal requirements concerning distribution of 
non-land assets. The distribution was simply not executed, which necessitated an additional 
presidential decree in June 2002. The debt problem – a major problem for many farms – could 
be solved by splitting the collective farm into two parts: one with assets where the market 
value was far below the book value and another where the market value exceeded the book 
value significantly. The process of restructuring gained additional momentum in March 2000 
when the President enacted a new decree resulting in forgiveness of public debt for those 
collective farms that changed their organizational status.  
 
The structural changes initiated removed many obstacles for transforming agriculture in 
Ukraine, but they created a new situation that is worrisome. It is hardly feasible to effectively 
restructure the agricultural sector in such a short period of time. The German experience 
showed that the distribution of farm property can lead to widespread problems of fraud. 
Property valuation is difficult, as book values differ significantly from market values, and the 
farm property to be redistributed may be falsely identified. Management may have better 
information than other members of the collective, but may not be interested in sharing the 
information – especially if it is interested in expropriating some of the property. Indeed, the 
experience of Ukraine supports these fears, as in many cases distribution of non-land assets 
did not take place. Managers who continued on the remaining part of collective farms 
preferred to keep the farms’ non-land assets for free. This situation provided additional 
rationale for the June 2001 Presidential Decree, which demanded the distribution of non-land 
assets. It is doubtful that the decree will have much effect, given that the underlying problems 
with asset valuation and identification remain unresolved. The threat of unsettled claims may 
persist for many years, undermining social stability in rural areas.  
 
Dissolution of collective farms and the creation of large-scale private farms will have some 
serious implications for the social sector, rural employment and the political market. Lerman 
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to the rural community (although less so over time) – and only a few transferred their social 
assets as required by law. It is questionable whether the new farms will contribute to the well-
being of the rural population to the same extent as the collective farms did. This does not 
mean that restructuring is not necessary. However, it would have been accompanied by less 
social hardship if the law on transferring social assets had been enforced and if the 
communities had been provided access to resources for financing social services. The formal 
institution governing social assets was not established efficiently and the emergence of the 
large-scale farms as new organizations (players in the game) gives rise to concern about 
whether the necessary transfer of the social assets can be enforced in the future.  
 
Repercussions for rural employment in Ukraine will likely be similar to those described above 
for the Russian Federation. The new farms will increase their capital intensity, shift the 
production pattern toward more capital-intensive products and lay off workers. Rural 
unemployment will likely increase significantly, while the availability of public goods and 
services will decline, giving workers – and especially skilled workers – additional incentives 
to leave rural areas (even if they are employed). The emerging structure will also have an 
impact in the political market in the rayons and oblasts.  
 
Summary and further research 
This article starts from the premise that an economy’s transition requires large-scale 
institutional change. Moreover, “there are vast domains of institutional transformation that 
cannot be achieved simply by the dictates of a proclamation from the central government” 
(Stiglitz, 2000). The premise leads to the conclusion that the approach of neoclassical 
economics does not offer adequate guidance for policy reform.  
 
Institutions defined as “rules that constrain human behaviour” are created in part 
spontaneously or by collective actions, or they may have evolved over time as part of culture 
and tradition. It is the latter set of institutions – the embedded ones – that are the main focus 
of the article, as their importance for agricultural transition has been widely ignored by 
economists. 
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countries’ institutions that are crucial for the transformation process. For example, all 
transition countries suffer from reforms that do not meet the expectations created at the outset 
of transition. Hence, one focus of the article is on institutional aspects governing reform 
policies, i.e. on the political economy aspects of the transition process that were decisive for 
the success or failure of the reforms.  
 
In particular, the article argues that policy reform is not merely a technical question; it 
comprises more than just setting the proper policy measure in the proper place. Instead, 
prevailing institutions and organizations in a country are the main determinants of the optimal 
set of policy instruments. It is important to keep in mind, though, that institutions can be 
changed. Strategies to design and implement efficient policy reform should be based on the 
identification of the mental models of the main stakeholders in the reform process.  
 
Agricultural economists have also widely neglected corporate governance problems, since 
these problems were not particularly an issue for the family farms or single-owner farms that 
dominate the farm sector in Western market economies. In the early transition phase it was 
widely expected that the CEECs would quickly restructure their agricultural sector towards 
family farms. Those expectations have not been fulfilled. The article explores the role of 
institutions for the governance of farms, the comparative advantage of farm sizes and the 
choice of specific legal forms of farms.  
 
The above analysis suggests several areas where focused research could help to identify and 
design policies to ease the adjustment process in agricultural transition. In concluding the 
analysis, we highlight our point of view through the following enumeration of the most urgent 
research areas. 
 
Interrelationship between holdings and policy-makers. There is a danger that managers of 
holding companies gain political power. Specific control mechanisms may be necessary. The 
implementation of such mechanisms might be facilitated by additional transparency in 
political decision-making. Research on the political process should focus on the strategic 
behaviour of the main players and their underlying objectives. 
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Income generation on large-scale farms, the rural economy and the social well-being of the 
rural population. Large farms may be able to generate higher rural income than the past 
collective farms or even than family farms would generate. However, production patterns in 
rural areas will differ from before the transition and from a family farm-based structure. 
Concerning agricultural production, it is likely that livestock production will decline in favour 
of crop production. This change will have repercussions on the downstream and upstream 
sectors in rural areas, with consequent lower employment in rural areas. The well-being of the 
rural population also depends on the production of public goods in the form of social services. 
Research should be conducted on how rural communities could be equipped to provide social 
services adequate for the reasonable well-being of the rural population.  
 
Large farms versus family farms in the case of distortions of labour markets. Agriculture is 
apt to be more efficient financially if structured in fairly large farms. The East German case 
supports this view. However, it is questionable whether a financially strong sector, such as 
agriculture in East Germany, contributes to efficient resource use in the region in the most 
effective way. Distorted factor markets, especially wages above the shadow price, may lead to 
rural unemployment (as in the East German case).  
 
Land market issues. Prospective changes in the land market in the Russian Federation and 
Ukraine give rise to the economic and political monopoly power of agricultural enterprises. 
There may be a need to control this power by improving transparency in land transactions or 
even by enacting a land law that requires the government to approve land transfers. (Some 
market economies have such laws.)  
 
Tax and subsidy issues. There is a presumption that tax considerations and subsidies have 
supported the emergence of large agroholdings in Ukrainian and Russian agriculture. The 
issue deserves more detailed research. Due to specific tax exemptions for agriculture, non-
agricultural enterprises may find it profitable to merge with agricultural ones and to save tax 
and/or to collect subsidies. There is a need to examine the effects of the present system of 
taxes and subsidies. 
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